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Promoting Executive Accountability Through
Qui Tam Legislation
Randy Beck*
The United States government has experienced a profound
rebalancing of power over the past century as authority has
shifted from the legislative branch to the executive branch.1 In
domestic affairs, much federal law now comes from agencies
operating under broad statutory mandates, and the tasks of
weighing conflicting interests, devising specific regulatory
standards, and setting enforcement priorities often fall to the
executive.2 In the international sphere, there has been a rapid
expansion in the number of agreements negotiated unilaterally
by the executive branch, without submission to the Senate for
ratification as treaties.3 With respect to military affairs,
presidents have become increasingly comfortable with unilateral
decisions to initiate combat and have sometimes side-stepped
even the post-hoc congressional review process contemplated by
the War Powers Resolution.4

* Justice Thomas O. Marshall Chair of Constitutional Law, University of Georgia
School of Law. The research for this essay was conducted while the author was a Garwood
Visiting Fellow in the James Madison Program in American Ideals and Institutions at
Princeton University. I would like to express my appreciation to Tom Campbell for his
comments on a draft of this essay.
1 Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Historical Gloss and the Separation of
Powers, 126 HARV. L. REV. 411, 444–45 (2012) (“The power of the modern presidency has
been enhanced by the gradual accumulation over time of an extensive array of legislative
delegations of power. The complexities of the modern economy and administrative state,
along with the heightened role of the United States in foreign affairs, have necessitated
broad delegations of authority to the executive branch.”).
2 See Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Executive Federalism Comes to America, 102 VA. L.
REV. 953, 961–62 (2016) (delegations of authority by Congress have increased the power
of the executive branch, particularly in light of legislative gridlock); PHILIP HAMBURGER,
IS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL? 111–28 (2014) (detailing numerous mechanisms
through which executive branch agencies exercise legislative functions).
3 See Treaties, UNITED STATES SENATE https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/
history/common/briefing/Treaties.htm#3 (last visited May 10, 2017) [http://perma.cc/876PNYLL]; Oona A. Hathaway, Treaties’ End: The Past, Present, and Future of International
Lawmaking in the United States, 117 YALE L.J. 1236, 1258–60 (2008) (375 treaties
entered into by the U.S. from 1980–2000, compared to 2744 congressionally authorized
executive agreements).
4 Douglas Kriner, Accountability Without Deliberation? Separation of Powers in
Times of War, 95 B.U. L. REV. 1275, 1284 (2015) (“Since Truman, all presidents have
asserted the office’s unilateral authority to order American military forces abroad, absent
explicit congressional authorization, to pursue a wide range of policy goals.”); see also Eric
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The increasing power of the executive branch underscores
the importance of effective mechanisms to enforce legal
constraints on executive conduct. The Constitution imposes on
the president the duty to “take [c]are that the laws be faithfully
executed,”5 and affords him the ability to respond to misconduct
by his subordinates.6 But relying on the executive branch to
police its own members will often prove inadequate due to
unavoidable conflicts of interest and the difficulty of managing a
vast bureaucracy. Congress can conduct occasional oversight
hearings to investigate the legality of executive actions, but
cannot directly respond to executive misconduct except through
cumbersome processes like lawmaking or impeachment.7 That
leaves the option of judicial enforcement of the law in suits by
persons outside the executive branch. However, this mechanism
can be stymied through application of Article III standing
principles and other justiciability rules like the political question
doctrine.8 In short, there may be many instances in which
potentially illegal executive conduct goes unaddressed due to
limitations of the standard options for ensuring executive branch
legal compliance.
In a forthcoming article, I review the history of a now
largely-abandoned method for enforcing the law against
government officials.9 From the fourteenth-century through the
establishment of the United States government, it was very
common for Anglo-American legislatures to regulate government
officials through qui tam legislation. A qui tam statute allowed
any member of the community to collect a fine for violation of a
legal duty, and keep part of the proceeds, even if the litigant did

A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Institutional Flip-Flops, 94 TEX. L. REV. 485, 497–98
(2016) (noting partisan invocation of constitutional and War Powers Act restrictions in
response to unilateral executive military interventions in Grenada, Panama, Serbia and
Libya); Bradley & Morrison, supra note 1, at 440–47 (explaining reasons it can be easier
for the executive branch to act than the legislative branch).
5 U.S. CONST. art I, § 3, cl. 1.
6 See Jurisdiction of Integrity Comm. When Inspector Gen. Leaves Office After
Referral of Allegations, 2006 WL 5779980, at 3–4 (O.L.C. Sept. 5, 2006).
7 Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951–59 (1983)
(Congress must comply with bicameralism and presentment requirements when acting to
change legal rights, duties or relations of persons outside the legislative branch); U.S.
CONST. art. I, §§ 2–3 (impeachment procedures), § 7 (procedures for passage of legislation).
8 See Lujan v. Def. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 575–78 (1992) (applying standing
doctrine to reject case against executive branch official); Stephen I. Vladeck, War and
Justiciability, 49 SUFFOLK L. REV. 47, 47–48 (2016) (courts avoided ruling on the merits of
Vietnam War cases in various ways including standing and political question grounds).
9 Randy Beck, Qui Tam Litigation Against Government Officials: Constitutional
Implications of a Neglected History, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. (forthcoming 2018)
[hereinafter Beck, Qui Tam Litigation Against Government Officials].
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not have a particularized injury as required by modern rules
of standing.10
This essay will consider the possibility of selectively reviving
the tradition of qui tam legislation to enforce particular legal
duties of executive branch officials. By overcoming Article III
standing concerns, qui tam legislation has the capacity to fill
gaps left by more common methods of enforcing the law. At the
same time, introducing a profit motive into law enforcement
carries risks that legislators should take into account. Part I will
briefly describe the history of qui tam regulation of government
officials in England, the early American states and the first two
Congresses, and discuss the Supreme Court’s conclusion that qui
tam litigation satisfies Article III standing requirements.11
Part II will consider hypothetical qui tam legislation to enforce
executive branch legal duties in three areas: (1) expending funds
without a supporting congressional appropriation, or refusing to
spend funds as directed by statute; (2) pursuing military action
in violation of the War Powers Resolution; and (3) using
private email systems for public business.12 Part III briefly
considers downsides of reviving qui tam legislation to regulate
executive officials.13
I. QUI TAM REGULATION OF GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS
The fourteenth-century English Parliament faced significant
challenges in providing for enforcement of laws governing a large
country with a dispersed population.14 Some legislation was less
problematic because it was designed to benefit private citizens
individually. Violation of this kind of statute could be addressed
through litigation pursued by the victim of illegal conduct.15 The
more difficult problem arose when a law protected interests of
the entire community or of the central government, rather than
individual citizens. Today, government officials typically enforce
such laws. In the fourteenth-century, however, there were far
fewer government officials, and those at the local level might not

10 Id. at 3; see also Vt. Agency of Nat. Res. v. U.S. ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 771–78
(2000) (finding qui tam plaintiff satisfied Article III standing requirements, even though
suing based on injury to the United States).
11 See infra notes 14–34 and accompanying text.
12 See infra notes 35–73 and accompanying text.
13 See infra notes 74–81 and accompanying text.
14 See Randy Beck, The False Claims Act and the English Eradication of Qui Tam
Legislation, 78 N.C. L. REV. 539, 567 (2000) [hereinafter Beck, English Eradication].
15 See, e.g., Statute of Labourers, 23 Edw. 3, ch. 1 (1349) (cause of action for party
“damnified” by food merchant charging excessive prices, but also allowing qui tam
enforcement as a backup).
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vigorously enforce laws designed to advance goals of the
central government.16
Parliament developed the qui tam statute to prevent underenforcement of penal statutes, which could deprive laws of their
deterrent effect.17 The typical qui tam statute imposed a legal
obligation, specified a forfeiture for violation, and provided that
any person could sue to collect the penalty, with the informer
entitled to keep a percentage (usually half) if successful.18 The
statutory authorization for anyone to sue, and the bounty offered
to the successful informer, effectively deputized any member of
the community to enforce the law, vastly expanding available law
enforcement resources.19
Most English qui tam statutes regulated private conduct,
often commercial in nature.20 Early on, however, Parliament also
deployed qui tam statutes to enforce specified duties of
government officials. Initially, such qui tam provisions were used
as a supplement to regulation of private commercial conduct,
promoting integrity and diligence among regulatory officials. For
instance, fourteenth-century statutes permitted qui tam actions
against officials who traded in regulated commodities or who
were less than diligent in enforcing regulatory requirements.21
Over time, though, Parliament expanded the practice to take in
an increasing array of officials performing a growing list of
functions, e.g., purveyors acquiring goods for the royal household,
ecclesiastical judges exceeding the limits on their jurisdiction,
officials responsible for enforcing religious uniformity laws,
revenue officers handling tax receipts, and individuals serving in
Parliament despite a statutory disqualification.22
Regulation of government officials through qui tam
legislation was widely practiced in the American colonies and
early states. Qui tam monitoring was used to promote statutory
compliance by an enormous variety of state officials, particularly
those performing decentralized functions such as road
construction and maintenance, judicial administration, and

Beck, English Eradication, supra note 14, at 567.
Id. at 568 (qui tam statute increased chances statutory forfeiture would be
enforced). The qui tam label derives from a longer Latin phrase that can be translated
“who pursues this action on our Lord the King’s behalf as well as his own.” Vt. Agency of
Nat. Res. v. U.S. ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 768 n.1 (2000).
18 Beck, English Eradication, supra note 14, at 552–53 (describing characteristics of
qui tam statutes).
19 Id. at 569.
20 Id. at 570–71.
21 See Beck, supra note 9, at 22–24.
22 See id. at 25–29.
16
17
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regulation of commercial activities.23 It was common for early
states to rely on qui tam oversight to ensure lawful conduct by
officials performing functions critical to public confidence in
government, such as conducting elections and collecting taxes.24
The United States Constitution was ratified against the
backdrop of over four and a half centuries in which AngloAmerican legislatures had often regulated government officials
through qui tam legislation.25 It should come as no surprise,
then, that the earliest Congresses extensively employed qui tam
statutes to regulate both private parties and executive branch
officials. Statutes enacted in the first two Congresses included
qui tam provisions applicable to federal revenue officers, census
workers, Treasury officials, postal workers, and those regulating
trade with Native American tribes.26 Qui tam regulation of
executive branch officials disappeared over time as the growing
number of government employees reduced the need for qui
tam oversight and the demand for professionalization of public
service prompted movement away from profit-motivated law
enforcement mechanisms.27 There can be no doubt though that
supervising the legality of executive branch conduct through qui
tam litigation was understood as a permissible legislative option
when the Constitution took effect.
The case for selective qui tam monitoring of the executive
branch rests on the Supreme Court’s understanding of
standing principles flowing from the Article III “case or
controversy” requirement. The Court has articulated a familiar
injury-causation-redressability test for evaluating a litigant’s
standing to sue: “The plaintiff must have suffered or be
imminently threatened with a concrete and particularized ‘injury
in fact’ that is fairly traceable to the challenged action of the
defendant and likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial
decision.”28 For a quarter century, the Supreme Court has
said that the requirement of a “particularized” injury—i.e., one
that affects the plaintiff in a manner distinct from the public
at large—represents part of the “irreducible constitutional
minimum” of standing.29 This particularized injury requirement
is often applied to deny standing in cases against the executive
Id. at 29–42.
Id. at 45–49.
25 Id. at 63.
26 See id. at 50–62.
27 See generally NICHOLAS R. PARRILLO, AGAINST THE PROFIT MOTIVE: THE SALARY
REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT, 1780–1940 (2013) (detailing the shift away from
profit-incentivized enforcement of the laws).
28 Lexmark Int’l Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377, 1386 (2014).
29 Id. (quoting Lujan v. Def. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)).
23
24
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branch, with courts dismissing claims that present only
“generalized grievances” about the legality of government conduct.30
Notwithstanding the rule that standing requires a
particularized injury, the Court has found that qui tam litigation
satisfies Article III requirements. In Vermont Agency of Natural
Resources v. United States ex rel. Stevens, the Court considered a
False Claims Act case in which a qui tam “relator” (i.e., informer)
alleged that a federal grant recipient submitted false claims to
the Environmental Protection Agency in an effort to obtain
excess grant funds.31 The Court recognized that the relator had
no personal injury in fact; the only particularized injury was
suffered by the government.32 The Court nevertheless found
Article III standing on the theory that the statute’s qui tam
provision acted as a partial assignment to the relator of the
government’s claim.33 The Court’s finding of standing for
informers was supported by the “long tradition of qui tam actions
in England and the American Colonies,” a history “well nigh
conclusive with respect to the question before us here:
whether qui tam actions were ‘cases and controversies of the sort
traditionally amenable to, and resolved by, the judicial
process.’”34 Since qui tam litigation allows the informer to
challenge the legality of conduct that inflicts no particularized
harm on the litigant, it creates the possibility of enhancing the
legal accountability of executive officials in situations where
private suits might easily be dismissed as generalized grievances.
II. POSSIBLE MODERN APPLICATIONS OF QUI TAM LEGISLATION TO
THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH
Qui tam legislation offers a potentially appealing mechanism
for promoting legal compliance by executive branch officers
because it allows judicial consideration of legal challenges that
might otherwise fail for lack of standing. Let’s consider
three types of legal duties that might be enforceable through qui
tam monitoring.
A.

Reinforcing the Congressional Power of the Purse
The Constitution vests in Congress broad control over the
use of public money. Congress has the affirmative power “to pay
the Debts and provide for the common Defense and general
See, e.g., Lujan, 504 U.S. at 571–78.
Vt. Agency of Nat. Res. v. U.S. ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 770 (2000).
See id. at 772–73.
33 Id. at 774.
34 Id. at 766–77 (quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83,
102 (1998)).
30
31
32
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Welfare of the United States.”35 This power is reinforced by a
negative prohibition: “No money shall be drawn from the
Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by law.”36
Administrations of both major political parties have sometimes
sought to circumvent the congressional power of the purse. The
Nixon Administration famously asserted an authority to
“impound” public funds, refusing to spend money on grounds
unrelated to the congressional spending program in question.37
The Obama Administration, on the other hand, was found to
have violated the Constitution by sending money to insurance
companies under the Affordable Care Act without a supporting
congressional appropriation.38
Standing doctrine tends to foreclose many lawsuits
challenging the use of public money.39 In Frothingham v. Mellon,
the Supreme Court determined that taxpayer status did not give
an individual standing to challenge the constitutionality of a
federal expenditure.40 An individual’s interest in money in the
U.S. Treasury “is shared with millions of others, is comparatively
minute and indeterminable, and the effect upon future taxation,
of any payment out of the funds, so remote, fluctuating and
uncertain, that no basis is afforded for an appeal to the
preventive powers of a court of equity.”41 This bar to taxpayer
standing has long been understood as one application of the
generalized grievance principle.42 Other case law has strictly
limited lawsuits by individual members of Congress seeking to
protect legislative powers.43 The recent case challenging
Affordable Care Act payments to insurers satisfied standing
concerns only because an entire house of Congress decided to file
suit, something that would be impossible in many cases.44
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
Id. art. I, § 9, cl. 7.
See Train v. City of N.Y., 420 U.S. 35, 40–41 (1975) (finding the statute did not
permit Environmental Protection Agency to allocate less funds for municipal sewage and
treatment facilities than Congress authorized for appropriation); Adam Rozenzweig,
The Article III Fiscal Power, 29 C ONST. C OMM. 127, 138–39 (2014) (discussing
impoundment controversy).
38 See U.S. House of Representatives v. Burwell, 185 F. Supp. 3d 165, 174–75
(D.D.C. 2016).
39 See, e.g., Brown v. Ruckelshaus, 364 F. Supp. 258, 265 (C.D. Cal. 1973) (plaintiff
lacked standing to challenge Environmental Protection Agency’s withholding of funds).
40 Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 488 (1923).
41 Id. at 487.
42 See Turner v. City & Cty. of S.F., 617 Fed. Appx. 674, 677 (9th Cir. 2015)
(claim asserted as taxpayer could not be pursued in federal court because only raised
generalized grievance).
43 See, e.g., Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 830 (1997) (holding individual members of
Congress lacked standing to challenge Line Item Veto Act).
44 U.S. House of Representatives v. Burwell, 130 F. Supp. 3d 53, 80–81
(D.D.C. 2015).
35
36
37
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There is precedent for using qui tam legislation to monitor
government officials in connection with fiscal matters, as in the
English and American statutes that regulated tax collection
efforts.45 Caswell v. Allen46 was an early American case against
one of the county supervisors of Cayuga County, New York. The
New York legislature had instructed the county to raise up to
$800 in tax revenues to build a fireproof clerk’s office near an
anticipated new courthouse.47 The defendant joined the majority
that voted down a proposal to comply with the legislative
directive. A qui tam informer then sued the defendant under a
statute imposing a $250 forfeiture on any county supervisor who
neglected or refused to follow a law directing the county to levy
funds for public buildings.48 The issue on appeal was whether the
legislation concerning funds for a clerk’s office was mandatory or
discretionary. The appellate court concluded that the legislation
imposed a mandatory duty to raise revenue for a clerk’s office
and therefore granted a new trial against the defendant.49
A modern qui tam statute could be used to reinforce
Congress’ power of the purse. The statute could impose a
forfeiture on any executive official who refused to spend funds
where a statute made the expenditure mandatory, or who
authorized an expenditure that was not supported by a
congressional appropriation. The qui tam provision would
overcome Article III objections and eliminate the barrier to
adjudication created by the rule against taxpayer standing.
B.

Preserving the Congressional Role in Military Affairs
The constitutional allocation to Congress of the power to
“declare war” has proved ineffective in ensuring congressional
control over the use of military force. Our political and legal
institutions early on accepted the lawfulness of military
engagements that involved no such declaration.50 In the
aftermath of the Vietnam War, Congress sought to reinvigorate
the legislative role in military decision-making by adopting the
War Powers Resolution (“WPR”). The provisions are complex, but
the key points can be outlined succinctly. The president must
See supra notes 22, 24 and 26 and accompanying text.
7 Johns. 63 (N.Y. 1810).
Id. at 63.
48 Id.
49 Id. at 68–69.
50 Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Congressional Authorization and the War
on Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2047, 2059–60 (2005) (“One reason is historical practice.
Starting with early conflicts against Indian tribes and the Quasi-War with France at the
end of the 1700s, the United States has been involved in hundreds of military
conflicts that have not involved declarations of war.”).
45
46
47
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consult with Congress whenever possible before introducing
military forces into actual or imminent “hostilities,”51 and must
report such deployments to Congress.52 As a general rule, the
resolution instructs the president to terminate the deployment of
troops unless Congress within sixty days declares war or adopts
“specific authorization” for the use of force.53 Authorization may
not be inferred from a provision of an appropriation statute
unless it “specifically authorizes the introduction of United
States Armed Forces into hostilities” and states that it is
intended to satisfy the WPR authorization requirement.54
Many observers argue that certain recent military operations
have violated the letter or spirit of the WPR. President Clinton
continued U.S. participation in the NATO bombing of Kosovo
beyond the sixty day limit of the WPR based on the theory that
Congress authorized the action through an appropriation
provision, even though the statute rejects authorization by that
means.55 President Obama claimed that extended participation
in the NATO operation in Libya was not subject to the WPR
because our drone and bombing attacks did not amount
to “hostilities.”56
Qui tam legislation was used historically to regulate militia
service, enforcing duties such as showing up for training
exercises with the necessary equipment.57 Could qui tam
legislation potentially help Congress in the higher profile context
of enforcing the WPR? Imagine a law imposing qui tam
forfeitures on executive branch officials for acts such as
(1) introducing troops into hostilities (perhaps accompanied by
further definition of the term) without consulting with Congress
in a situation where such consultation was possible, (2) failing to
report to Congress within a specified time period after troops
have been introduced into hostilities, or (3) continuing

50 U.S.C. § 1542.
Id. § 1543(a).
Id. § 1544(b).
54 Id. § 1547(a)(1).
55 See Jason Reed Struble & Richard A.C. Alton, The Legacy of Operation Allied
Force: A Reflection on Its Legality Under United States and International Law, 20 MICH.
ST. INT’L L. REV. 293, 310–13 (2012). But see Abraham D. Sofaer, The War Powers
Resolution and Kosovo, 34 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 71, 76–77 (2000) (arguing WPR provision
preventing appropriations from serving as approval of a military operation is
legally ineffective).
56 Jack Goldsmith & Matthew Waxman, Obama, Not Bush, Is the Master
of Unilateral War, N EW R EPUBLIC (Oct. 14, 2014), https://newrepublic.com/
article/119827/obamas-war-powers-legacy-he-must-seek-congressional-authorization
[http://perma.cc/R34Z-8NPC] (stating that Obama administration construction of War
Powers Resolution in connection with Libya operations was unconvincing).
57 See Beck, supra note 9, at 43.
51
52
53
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participation in hostilities for more than 60 days without
congressional authorization in the required form.
A qui tam provision could remove the Article III standing
barrier that courts have invoked to avoid adjudication of claims
under the WPR.58 Cases seeking to enforce the resolution could
nevertheless face other barriers to justiciability, especially the
political question doctrine.59 The application of the political
question doctrine depends on a variety of factors,60 but the force
of some factors could be minimized by careful drafting. For
instance, if Congress specified objective conditions that would
trigger legal duties under the WPR and made clear that the
duties are mandatory rather than discretionary, a court would be
less likely to find a lack of “judicially discoverable and
manageable standards” for resolving the case or the need for “an
initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial
discretion.”61 Dismissal on political question grounds would be
more likely if the legal question arguably turned on the exercise
of military or foreign affairs expertise. For instance, a court
might find a political question if the executive branch was
offering an intelligence-based analysis of the historical
relationship between Al Qaeda and the Islamic State to argue
that operations against the Islamic State come within the scope
of the 2001 Authorization for the Use of Military Force against Al
Qaeda.62 On the other hand, if the sole issue was whether
Congress had authorized a military action and (as in Kosovo)
the only arguable authorization was an appropriations bill,
the questions presented to the court would seem more legal
in nature.
While a qui tam provision might help get a WPR case into
court, it is an open question whether one should view that as a
desirable outcome. Some people would consider it unwise to place

58 See Campbell v. Clinton, 203 F.3d 19, 20–26 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (finding members
of Congress lacked standing to challenge Kosovo bombing as a violation of the War
Powers Resolution).
59 See Vladeck, supra note 8, at 47–48 (noting that in cases challenging the Vietnam
War, courts avoided decisions on the merits in “every way imaginable,” including political
question doctrine).
60 See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
61 Id.
62 See MATTHEW C. WEED, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, R43760, A NEW
AUTHORIZATION FOR USE OF MILITARY FORCE AGAINST THE ISLAMIC STATE: ISSUES AND
CURRENT PROPOSALS (2017) (“During his Administration, President Obama stated that
the Islamic State can be targeted under the 2001 AUMF because its predecessor
organization, Al Qaeda in Iraq, communicated and coordinated with Al Qaeda; the Islamic
State currently has ties with Al Qaeda fighters and operatives; the Islamic State employs
tactics similar to Al Qaeda; and the Islamic State, with its intentions of creating a new
Islamic caliphate, is the ‘true inheritor of Osama bin Laden’s legacy.’”).
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the president under legally enforceable constraints—even the
loose constraints of the WPR—in dealing with rapidly changing
international threats. Moreover, those desiring a greater
congressional voice in decisions about the use of military force
might find that overcoming barriers to adjudication proved a
Pyrrhic victory. A court could resolve a case on the merits by
reading the WPR in a manner deferential to the executive.63
C.

Preserving Official Email Records
So far, we have discussed use of qui tam legislation to allow
adjudication of high-level legal conflicts central to the allocation
of power between Congress and the president. Disputes over the
congressional appropriations power or the president’s unilateral
initiation of military action are important, but not frequent.
Historically, qui tam legislation was more often used to monitor
activities of lower level officials performing the mundane daily
tasks of government. For instance, qui tam statutes were often
used in past centuries to promote thorough and accurate record
keeping by public officials. English law used qui tam remedies to
regulate record keeping regarding sales of horses at fairs and
markets.64 Early state laws deployed qui tam monitoring to
ensure that records of a justice of the peace were preserved upon
death or resignation.65 The first Congress adopted qui tam
legislation to govern creation and retention of census records.66
To round out our discussion of the potential use of qui tam
legislation to promote executive branch accountability, it is worth
considering a modern record-keeping question that has been
much in the news. The 2016 presidential election was roiled by
disclosures that the Democratic nominee had set up a private
email system through which she sent and received official
electronic correspondence in her role as Secretary of State.67
Official inquiries confirmed that an earlier Republican Secretary
of State had also conducted some government business through a
private email account.68 Doing public business on a private email
63 Given longstanding questions about the constitutional status of the War Powers
Resolution, the risk of an executive-leaning interpretation might be heightened by the
canon of constitutional avoidance. See Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 380–81 (2005) (“If
one of [two plausible statutory constructions] would raise a multitude of constitutional
problems, the other should prevail—whether or not those constitutional problems pertain
to the particular litigant before the Court.”).
64 Beck, supra note 9, at 25.
65 Id. at 37–38.
66 Id. at 56–57.
67 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, ESP-16-03, OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY:
EVALUATION OF EMAIL RECORDS MANAGEMENT AND CYBERSECURITY REQUIREMENTS 23–25
(2016) (discussing private email use by Secretary Clinton).
68 Id. at 21–22 (discussing private email use by Secretary Powell).
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system can undermine laws designed to ensure preservation of
records, promote transparency, and reduce cybersecurity risks.69
Notwithstanding campaign criticism of the Democratic nominee’s
email practices, at least six close advisors to President Trump
have reportedly used private email accounts since the election to
discuss White House matters.70
A private litigant might have difficulty challenging an
official’s practice of using a private email account for public
business. Assuming a relevant cause of action could be identified,
the plaintiff could be deemed to allege a generalized grievance
widely shared by the public at large.71 One public interest
organization did manage to secure disclosure of many of the
Secretary of State’s emails using the Freedom of Information Act
(“FOIA”), presumably establishing a particularized injury based
on the rights created by a FOIA request.72 However, since FOIA
applies to an agency, it may not guarantee accountability of
individual federal employees, and a significant number of agency
records are exempt from release under the statute.73
So how might qui tam legislation address modern concerns
about email preservation by government employees? Imagine a
statute imposing a $1000 forfeiture for each email sent in the
course of a government employee’s official duties using a private
email account. Statutory definitions could be used to create
greater certainty about when an email was subject to the statute.
A safe harbor provision could protect a government employee
from suit if an email sent from a private account was promptly
archived among the government’s official email records. The
legislation could be enforced by any qui tam informer with

69 See id. at 2–19 (record keeping, preservation and transparency requirements), 26–
34 (cybersecurity policies). Lisa Jackson, director of the Environmental Protection Agency
in President Obama’s first term, raised comparable transparency and record-keeping
concerns (though not necessarily cybersecurity risks) when she sent emails on a second
government email account registered under the alias “Richard Windsor.” Julian Hattam,
Former EPA Chief Under Fire for New Batch of ‘Richard Windsor’ Emails, THE HILL
(May 1, 2013), http://thehill.com/regulation/energy-environment/297255-former-epa-chiefunder-fire-for-new-batch-of-richard-windsor-emails [http://perma.cc/7E5L-5FXN]; see also
Jaime Dupree, Documents Show Ex-Attorney General Lynch Used “Elizabeth Carlisle” as
Email Alias, ATLANTA JOURNAL CONST. (Aug. 7, 2017), http://jamiedupree.blog.ajc.com/
2017/08/07/documents-show-ex-attorney-general-lynch-used-elizabeth-carlisle-as-emailalias/ [http://perma.cc/864J-T3RP].
70 Matt Apuzzo & Maggie Haberman, At Least 6 White House Advisers Used Private
Email Accounts, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 25, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/25/us/
politics/private-email-trump-kushner-bannon.html.
71 See, e.g., United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 176–77 (1974) (lawsuit
challenging failure to release list of CIA expenditures presented a generalized grievance).
72 See Judicial Watch, Inc. v. Kerry, 844 F.3d 952, 953 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (case seeking
to recover emails from former Secretary of State’s private email accounts not moot).
73 See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 552b(c) (1976) (FOIA exemptions).
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evidence of an email violating the prohibition, with a successful
informer entitled to keep half (or perhaps all) of the recovery as
a bounty.
At this point, some readers may be thinking this sounds like
an excellent way to ensure that executive branch employees
comply with legal obligations flowing from their role as public
servants. Other readers, however, may be getting nervous as
they contemplate how the statute might work in practice. Would
federal employees be distracted from their jobs by burdensome
litigation? Would profit-motivated lawyers or informers develop a
business of targeting careless federal employees? Would the
statute be put to political use by interest groups or partisan
warriors? Such concerns underscore some of the possible
downsides of qui tam regulation and help explain why such
statutes fell into disfavor in England and the United States. The
next section discusses some of the problems with qui tam
legislation and whether those problems might be ameliorated
through legislative drafting.
III. POSSIBLE DRAWBACKS TO QUI TAM REGULATION OF
EXECUTIVE OFFICIALS
England eliminated its remaining qui tam statutes in 1951.74
I have argued elsewhere that recurring problems experienced in
the history of qui tam enforcement flowed from a conflict of
interest built into the design of the legislation. A qui tam statute
deputizes private citizens to represent the interests of the public
in enforcing the law, but simultaneously offers the informer a
private financial interest in the outcome. When these public and
private interests pull in different directions, informers may
pursue private gain at the expense of the public good.75
English informers sometimes negotiated secret settlements
with those allegedly in violation of qui tam legislation, keeping
payments that should have been shared with the government.76
They sometimes pursued fraudulent or malicious claims.77 They
brought suit in inconvenient locations, making it burdensome for
defendants to litigate.78 They sought to enforce statutes in ways
that undermined the public good.79 Legislative responses to such
abuses were only partially successful.80 Professional informers,

74
75
76
77
78
79
80

Beck, English Eradication, supra note 14, at 548–49.
Id. at 549.
Id. at 580–81.
Id. at 581–83.
Id. at 583.
Id. at 583–85.
Id. at 574–75, 590.
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who made a livelihood through qui tam litigation, came to
be despised by the public and were sometimes beaten by
angry mobs.81
It is easy to imagine a modern informer’s conflict of interest
producing analogous problems to those experienced in English
history. If a statute permitted qui tam litigation against
executive branch employees for failing to perform some legal
duty, lawyers might be tempted to build a practice around suing
agents of the federal government. The public interest could be
undermined by distracting employees from their duties, or by
applying the statute to the limits of its language. If there was a
qui tam statute penalizing government use of private email, for
instance, and a federal employee used a private email system to
deal with an unanticipated emergency, a public prosecutor would
have discretion to decline to bring a case, reasoning that the
public interest did not warrant prosecution. The bounty provision
of a qui tam statute, however, tends to make profit maximization
the goal of law enforcement. Qui tam legislation can effectively
eliminate the disinterested exercise of prosecutorial discretion for
the benefit of the public.
Such problems could potentially be ameliorated in the
drafting process. Perhaps Congress could make qui tam bounties
very low, so that such litigation would only be pursued by public
interest firms motivated by considerations other than profit.
Perhaps the legislation could place a cap on the amount a person
could earn under a qui tam statute, preventing individuals from
becoming professional informers. There could be a mechanism for
the Department of Justice to dismiss qui tam cases it considered
abusive or contrary to the public interest. At the very least,
however, the problems that led England to eliminate qui tam
legislation midway through the last century suggest that
Congress should exercise great caution, carefully weighing costs
and benefits, before deploying this particular tool for promoting
executive branch accountability.

81

Id. at 576–78.

